B1. Log Preferences
Take U (g) = log(g) and W (x) = log(⌧ + x) for > 0. Equations (1) and (6) 
The uncoordinated program in (7), on the other hand, reduces to the first two lines of (B3).
As explained in the paper, the di↵erence between the optimal coordinated fiscal rule and the optimal uncoordinated fiscal rule can be expressed as a function of the redistributive and disciplining e↵ects of the interest rate. Under log preferences, 1 the sum of these two e↵ects is
. Equation (B4) is the same as equation (15) but allowing for any > 0. This equation shows that the redistributive e↵ect of the interest rate dominates the disciplining e↵ect if and only if R (✓ ⇤ c ) < 1/ . As discussed in the paper, the redistributive e↵ect is stronger on the margin when interest rates are low. 36
B2. Proof of Proposition 3
The first part of the proposition follows from the arguments in the text. We prove the second part by example. Take log preferences. Analogous to the expressions in Section B1 above, given cuto↵s ✓ ⇤ 2 [0, ✓] and ✓ ⇤⇤ 2 [0, ✓ ⇤ ], the aggregate savings rate in the economy is
and the coordinated program can be written as Figure B1 depicts the cuto↵ ✓ ⇤ u in the optimal uncoordinated rule and the cuto↵s ✓ ⇤ c and ✓ ⇤⇤ c in the optimal coordinated rule, as a function of . Recall that ✓ ⇤⇤ u  ✓ always holds. Hence, as shown in the figure, we find that
B3. Proof of Proposition 4
To prove the first part of the proposition, we follow analogous steps as in the proof of Proposition 2 for the case of  ✓. We show that setting a coordinated cuto↵ ✓ ⇤ = ✓ is not optimal. Note that by Proposition 2, if = 0, then ✓ ⇤ = ✓ 36 The relevant threshold for R(✓ ⇤ c ) depends on because a reduction in has a similar e↵ect as a reduction in R(✓ ⇤ c ): all types shift spending to the present when declines. 1 Model
Setup
We study a simple model of fiscal policy in which a continuum of governments each make a spending and borrowing decision. Our setup is the same as that analyzed in Amador, Werning and Angeletos (2006) , with the exception that we allow for multiple governments and an endogenous interest rate. There are two periods and a unit mass of ex-ante identical governments.
12 At the beginning of the first period, each government observes a shock to its economy, > 0, which is the government's private information or type. is drawn from a bounded set ⌘ ⇥ , ⇤ with a continuously di erentiable distribution function
Following the realization of , each government chooses first-period public spending g and second-period assets x subject to a budget constraint:
where is the revenue of the government in the initial period and R is the endogenously determined gross interest rate.
The government's welfare prior to the realization of its type is
where
government's utility from first-period spending g and W (x) is the government's continuation value associated with carrying forward assets x. 13 Note that a higher value of corresponds to a higher marginal benefit of first-period spending. As in Amador, Werning and Angeletos (2006), we take to be a taste shock multiplying first-period utility. This is a tractable way to introduce a value for flexibility, as Lizzeri and Yariv (2015) . 12 We purposely abstract away from heterogeneity in order to study di↵erences between coordinated and uncoordinated fiscal rules that are not due to countries having di↵erent characteristics. We show the robustness of our results to ex-ante heterogeneity in Section 4.4.
13 Here W (·) is simply taken to be the second-period utility of assets, including any discount factor. In Section 4.5, we provide a microfoundation for W (·) in an infinite horizon economy.
6
individual governments prefer slacker constraints than those optimally imposed by the central authority. If governments' present bias is large, on the other hand, Proposition 2 implies that governments would want to impose stricter rules on themselves than imposed centrally. In this case, the fraction of governments which have the ability to implement additional constraints would choose to adopt their optimal uncoordinated fiscal rule
What is the impact on the world economy? How would the central authority respond?
Arguments analogous to those in Lemma 1 imply that when a fraction of governments adopt tighter fiscal rules, the interest rate declines. If the coordinated fiscal rule is kept unchanged, with a spending limit g ⇤ c , the lower interest rate then induces higher borrowing and spending by the remaining governments whose rules have not changed. That is, by imposing more discipline on themselves, the fraction of governments worsen fiscal discipline everywhere else.
In response to this, however, the central authority would optimally change the coordinated spending limit g ⇤ c . Under certain conditions, we are able to solve the central authority's problem when a fraction of governments choose their optimal uncoordinated rule ⇤ u < ⇤ c , and we find that the optimal level of discretion for the remaining fraction of countries is decreasing in . When the optimal coordinated fiscal rule is slacker than the uncoordinated one, an ine ciency arises if some governments can adopt tighter fiscal rules than those imposed centrally. As described above, the tighter rules depress global interest rates and reduce fiscal discipline for the rest of the governments. Moreover, note that under log preferences, equations (13) and (14) yield
and thus the sum of the redistributive and disciplining e ects of the interest rate is 22 by the central authority. If governments' present bias is large, on the other hand, Proposition 2 implies that governments would want to impose stricter rules on themselves than imposed centrally. In this case, the fraction of governments which have the ability to implement additional constraints would choose to adopt their optimal uncoordinated fiscal rule
and thus the sum of the redistributive and disciplining e ects of the interest rate is 22 Proposition 3. Consider fiscal rules consisting of a maximum a maximum surplus limit, given by cuto s
In an optimal uncoordinated fiscal rule, If governments' present bias is large enough, then for some our model, the optimal coordinated fiscal rule will set a strictly deficit limit and a strictly lower maximum surplus limit than th dinated fiscal rule. To see the idea, combine the first-order cond in (12) with the analog of that condition for ⇤⇤ c . We obtain tha interior, then
The left-hand side is the average distortion due to overborrow the right-hand side is the average distortion due to overborrowi The optimal coordinated rule specifies ( ⇤ c , ⇤⇤ c ) to equalize th under a large present bias, committing to overborrowing by low welfare by increasing the interest rate and reducing overborrowi Maximum deficit and surplus limits are simple policy instr not require the use of transfers.
24 More broadly, one could setting to allow for other instruments that imply transfers, lik We make two observations. First, one may conjecture that a borrowing or the associated interest income could be used by the to increase fiscal discipline. However, in a closed economy wi like ours, a linear tax would have no e ect on the equilibrium e.g., Diamond, 1967; Hart, 1975; Stiglitz, 1982 ; Geanakoplos an 1986). Intuitively, since the endogenous interest rate adjusts, a only result in a proportional change in R so that the e ective Proposition 3. Consider fiscal rules consisting of a maximum deficit limit and a maximum surplus limit, given by cuto s
In an optimal uncoordinated fiscal rule, If governments' present bias is large enough, then for some specifications of our model, the optimal coordinated fiscal rule will set a strictly higher maximum deficit limit and a strictly lower maximum surplus limit than the optimal uncoordinated fiscal rule. To see the idea, combine the first-order condition for 
The left-hand side is the average distortion due to overborrowing by low types; the right-hand side is the average distortion due to overborrowing by high types. The optimal coordinated rule specifies ( ⇤ c , ⇤⇤ c ) to equalize these costs. Thus, under a large present bias, committing to overborrowing by low types can boost welfare by increasing the interest rate and reducing overborrowing by high types.
Maximum deficit and surplus limits are simple policy instruments which do not require the use of transfers.
24 More broadly, one could depart from our setting to allow for other instruments that imply transfers, like (interior) taxes. We make two observations. First, one may conjecture that a Pigouvian tax on borrowing or the associated interest income could be used by the central authority to increase fiscal discipline. However, in a closed economy with only one asset like ours, a linear tax would have no e ect on the equilibrium allocation (see, e.g., Diamond, 1967; Hart, 1975; Stiglitz, 1982; Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis, 1986) . Intuitively, since the endogenous interest rate adjusts, a linear tax would only result in a proportional change in R so that the e ective cost of borrowing 24 As noted previously, solving for the optimal coordinated mechanism without transfers in full generality is di cult, as the problem is not convex when the interest rate is endogenous. This is in contrast to the uncoordinated problem, which, as shown in Amador, Werning and Angeletos (2006) Figure B1 . Maximum surplus limits.
is indeed not optimal. Moreover, since the objective function of the coordinated problem is continuous in ✓ ⇤ and , it follows that for = ", " > 0 arbitrarily small, ✓ ⇤ = ✓ is not optimal either. Therefore, given  ✓, there exists 2 (0, 1) such that if  , then ✓ ⇤ c > ✓ ⇤ u and ✓ ⇤ c > ✓. To prove the second part of the proposition, take log preferences and assume ✓ ⇤ c is a unique and interior global optimum with ✓ ⇤ c > ✓ ⇤ u . We consider the program that solves for the optimal coordinated fiscal rule taking into account that a fraction of governments choose ✓ ⇤ u . Analogous to the analysis in Section B1 above, given a rule ✓ ⇤ > ✓ ⇤ u , the aggregate savings rate in the economy is (we allow here for any > 0; the statement of Proposition 4 takes = 1):
The coordinated program, taking the 3 heterogeneity into account, can be written as
(1 ) 2 6 6 6 4
subject to (9).
The first-order condition, assuming an interior optimum, is (B7)
Since ✓ ⇤ c is the unique global optimum, we can determine its comparative statics with respect to by implicit di↵erentiation of (B7). Since the program is locally concave, the derivative of the left-hand side of (B7) with respect to ✓ ⇤ c is negative. If we can establish that the derivative of the left-hand side of (B7) with respect to is negative, then this implies that ✓ ⇤ c is locally decreasing in . We find that this is indeed the case: the derivative of the left-hand side of (B7) with respect to is
where we have taken into account that dS
B4. Proof of Proposition 5
To prove the first part of the proposition, we follow the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 2 for the case of  ✓, taking into account that (4) is now replaced by (16). Suppose L  0. Then note that any rule with ✓ ⇤ c 2 [✓ ⇤ u , ✓] is weakly dominated by a rule with ✓ ⇤ c = ✓, as an increase in ✓ ⇤ c to ✓ changes the allocation only through its positive e↵ect on the interest rate, and this improves welfare given L  0. Therefore, to prove the first part of the proposition for L  0, it su ces to show that ✓ ⇤ c = ✓ is not optimal. This is what we prove next. 4
Note that R 0 (✓ ⇤ ) continues to satisfy (A2), and it satisfies (A9) when ✓ ⇤ = ✓. The first-order condition of the coordinated problem must therefore satisfy
Recall that R 0 (✓) > 0. Thus, if L < 0, the expression above is strictly positive, implying that ✓ ⇤ = ✓ is not optimal as an increase in ✓ ⇤ would increase welfare. If instead L = 0, then by the proof of Proposition 2, ✓ ⇤ = ✓ is not optimal either. Hence, given  ✓, we obtain
Finally, since the objective function of the coordinated problem is continuous in ✓ ⇤ and L, it follows that for L = ", " > 0 arbitrarily small, the result holds as well. Therefore, given  ✓, there exists
To prove the second part of the proposition, we consider the problem under log preferences as in Section B1, but with (4) now replaced by (16). The program in (B3) becomes (we allow here for any > 0; the statement of Proposition 5 takes = 1):
The first-order condition, assuming an interior optimum, is (B8)
Since by assumption ✓ ⇤ c is the unique global optimum given L, we can determine its comparative statics with respect to L by implicit di↵erentiation of (B8). Since the program is locally concave, the derivative of the left-hand side of (B8) with respect to ✓ ⇤ c is negative. If we can establish that the derivative of the left-hand side of (B8) with respect to L is negative, then this implies that ✓ ⇤ c is locally decreasing in L. We find that this is indeed the case: the derivative of the lefthand side of (B8) with respect to L is
B5. Proof of Proposition 6
Define ⇤ ui as the optimal uncoordinated rule for country group i with parameters {f i , i }, and let ⇤ c be the optimal coordinated rule for both country groups, given {f N , N , f S , S , }. The first part of the proposition ( ) follows from analogous reasoning as in the proof of the first part of Proposition 2:
To prove the second part of the proposition (  ), take
Note that any rule ⇤ c  would yield the same allocation and hence the same welfare as a rule ⇤ c = . Therefore, to prove the proposition, it su ces to show that ⇤ c = is not optimal. To prove this, consider a fiscal rule ⇤ = with associated interest rate R = R ( ⇤ ). Welfare under this rule is given by (18). The first derivative with respect to ⇤ is
The rest of the proof proceeds in the same way as the proof of our main result for homogeneous countries in Proposition 2 and is thus omitted.
B6. Infinite Horizon
Consider an infinite horizon version of our model, with periods t 2 {0, 1, . . . , T }, T ! 1, and discount factor 2 (0, 1). The government's welfare at t before the realization of its type ✓ t is
Standard arguments imply that W t+1 is a concave and continuously di↵erentiable function of x t+1 . Hence, this problem is isomorphic to that of the two-period model, and by Proposition 1 the optimal choice of ✓ ⇤ u (t, x t ) satisfies (9). We next study the implications of a time-invariant coordinated rule ✓ ⇤ for the interest rate.
LEMMA 3: Consider an infinite horizon economy with i.i.d. shocks and U (g t ) = log(g t ). If all countries are subject to a time-invariant rule ✓ ⇤ in each period, the interest rate R t is constant over time and satisfies (B14)
.
PROOF:
Under log preferences, (B10) can be written as Denote the flexible savings rate in period t by
which is a function of ✓ t and does not depend on future interest rates or current assets. Now consider a time-invariant fiscal rule ✓ ⇤ in a T -period economy. The analog of (B17) in a finite horizon setting implies that at date T 1, a country chooses its flexible savings rate if ✓ T 1  ✓ ⇤ and the flexible savings rate that would correspond to type ✓ ⇤ if ✓ T 1 > ✓ ⇤ . It then follows by backward induction that s (✓ t , t, x t ) = max s f (✓ t ) , s f (✓ ⇤ ) at each t 2 {0, . . . , T 1}. Taking the limit of the T -period economy as T ! 1, the global resource constraint at t can therefore be written as
where we have taken into account that savings rates are independent of assets and the sum of assets across countries is zero in each period. The fact that this equation holds for all periods t implies (B14). Consider now the class of rules ✓ ⇤ (t) which are possibly time-varying but apply to all countries symmetrically, independently of their assets. We show that there is an optimal coordinated fiscal rule within this class which is time-invariant. Moreover, this rule satisfies our results in Proposition 2.
